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Abstract
We analyze in this paper the growth and welfare consequences arising from the lack
of auditing commitment in a credit market with costly state verification. Specifically,
two endogenous growth models, of which one allows lenders to commit to costly au-
diting strategies to identify borrowers’ investment returns and the other does not, are
compared. We show that the inability to commit acts as an additional source of infor-
mational friction that leads to more stringent contractual terms, which in turn result
in lower capital accumulation, growth, and welfare. In addition, when a tax on capital
is considered, the tax-induced investment distortions are amplified by the absence of
auditing commitment. From the policy perspective, our analysis can be interpreted as
suggesting a new micro-economic channel through which institutional failings hinder
economic growth and social welfare.
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1 Introduction
There has been a growing interest, and body of work, in the literature in applying principal-
agent contract theories to analyze macroeconomic issues such as business cycles, capital
accumulation, and economic growth. For example, Williamson (1986, 1987) studies the
impact of equilibrium credit rationing in a financial market with costly state verification
problem. In a model with agency costs varying inversely with borrowers’ net worth, Bernanke
and Gertler (1989) argue that the credit market imperfection can amplify and propagate the
external shocks to create significant economic fluctuations. Bose and Cothren (1996, 1997)
examine the adverse effects of ex-ante asymmetric information on growth in a model that
allows for both rationing and screening contracts. More recently, Ho and Wang (2005,
2007) investigate the impacts of adverse selection in the credit market on public capital
provision, taxation policy, and economic growth. However, it is well recognized that the self-
selection equilibrium used in many of these applications does not satisfy the time consistency
property, as long as there are costs associated with the revelation principle in sustaining such
an equilibrium. This problem of time (in)consistency can be simply stated as follows. In a
typical principal-agent environment with the presence of asymmetric information, if agents
will end up self selecting themselves according to their true types in equilibrium, the principal
has the incentive to forgo the costly enforcement activities, such as screening or auditing as
the case may be, that are specified and required in equilibrium contracts in order to induce
the self selection of agents at the first place.1 Moreover, there is another drawback associated
with the self-selection equilibrium: it implies that all agents in those principal-agent setups
will not lie about their types in equilibrium. This predication certainly appears to be at
odds with the casual observation that fraudulent reporting and claims made by individuals
and companies are in fact quite pervasive in real life. Indeed, some anecdotal and empirical
evidences have been well documented.2
The present paper intends to study the credit market equilibrium that is free from the
1Perhaps less obvious, similar argument also applies in the cases with rationing contracts that do not
require costly contract enforcement (see Bencivenga and Smith 1993, Bose and Cothren 1996 and 1997).
In equilibrium, once the lenders announced the loan contract terms including the probability of obtaining
funds, borrowers will self select in accordance with their own types. Then rationing is no longer optimal for
the lenders: they can simply deny loans to the undesirable borrowers and allocate all funds to the borrowers
of the preferred type.
2Tax evasion provides an obvious example of fraudulent behavior by agents in the principal-agent context.
In this regard, the study by Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998) estimated that the nominal tax gap,
defined as the difference between the income taxes households owed and what they actually reported and
paid voluntarily, had almost a fivefold increase from $22.7 billion to $95.3 billion in the United States for
the tax years from 1973 to 1992.
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above time inconsistency problem and explore its implications on economic growth and
welfare in an endogenous growth framework. Specifically, we consider in our model a credit
market in which investment returns are privately observed by borrowers and state verification
by lenders is costly. Following the approach in Khalil (1997) and Khalil and Parigi (1998), we
will assume that lenders cannot commit to a auditing strategy when making their loan offers
to borrowers, and the interaction between lenders and borrowers is modeled as a two-stage
problem. In the first stage, lenders choose and offer the optimal contracts consisting of the
loan rates and the loan size. In the second stage, lenders and borrowers play a simultaneous
Nash game to decide on their auditing and cheating strategies, respectively. Under this
setup, the auditing strategy is not announced in the first stage as a part of the contractual
terms due to the lack of auditing commitment and, rather, the equilibrium auditing and
cheating strategies are simultaneously determined as the mutual best responses to each other
in the second-stage Nash game. The equilibrium auditing strategy determined this way is,
therefore, no longer subject to the aforementioned time inconsistency problem. Furthermore,
it will be clear that the Nash equilibrium in the second-stage game is characterized by mixed-
strategies for both lenders and borrowers, which implies that both auditing and cheating
will take place with positive probabilities in equilibrium.3 Consequently, the credit market
equilibrium in this setup exhibits certain degree of cheating on the part of agents – an
implication that squares well with those documented evidence of cheating behavior in real
life.
More precisely, we consider a widely studied contractual environment with the presence
of costly state verification. In this environment, borrowers (agents) seek loans from lenders
(the principal) to finance their investment projects, whose random returns (high or low)
are observed by agents themselves and can be verified by the principal only through costly
auditing. As is typical in this kind of principal-agent situation, the self-selection equilibrium
contracts assume the form whereby the borrowers who report low returns are audited with
a positive probability while those who report high returns are never audited. However,
as described in the time inconsistency problem earlier, this type of equilibrium can easily
unravel due to the incentives of lenders to forgo the costly auditing once borrowers are
3An early example of this line of research that focuses on commitment issues in contact/game situations
can be found in Graetz et al (1986), which studies a game between taxpayers and tax collector (IRS) wherein
the auditing strategy of IRS cannot be committed ex ante, and an individual taxpayer’s cheating strategy
and IRS’s auditing strategy are characterized by Nash equilibrium. The work by Bester and Strausz (2001)
modifies and extends the revelation principle in more general environments in which the principal cannot
commit to the outcome induced by a mechanism. In the generalized equilibrium, the optimal strategy of the
agent needs not to entail truthful reporting with certainty, but only does so with a positive probability.
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induced to report their true investment returns. For such a self-selection equilibrium to be
viable, one needs to assume (either explicitly or implicitly) that the lenders can commit to the
pre-announced auditing policy. But such an assumption on lenders’ commitment is indeed
questionable on several grounds. First of all, it is against lenders’ self interest. Secondly, in
most of the existing literature, the interaction between borrowers and lenders only lasts for
one period and hence precludes the possibility of using any reputation mechanisms to resolve
the time inconsistency problem.4 Moreover, the lack of proper institutional mechanisms to
enforce and bind lenders’ auditing decisions will ultimately render such commitment (by
lenders) untenable. Thus, for much of our analysis, we will take the position that it is in fact
not possible for lenders to commit to any pre-announced auditing strategy and such inability
to commit by lenders is known to both sides of the contract.
We then imbed the above credit market friction into a framework similar to those in
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bhattacharya (1998). The economy consists of overlapping
generations of heterogeneous agents who live for two periods. In each period, young lenders
(or workers) earn their wage income, which in turn constitutes the source of loan supply
in the credit market, by supplying their endowed labor in the labor market. On the other
hand, young borrowers (or entrepreneurs), who are endowed with capital-producing projects,
approach lenders for loans in the credit market amidst the previously described informational
frictions. In order to understand the consequences of the inability-to-commit assumption,
we first discuss the benchmark model with the conventional assumption that commitment to
pre-announced auditing is always upheld by lenders. Not surprisingly, the usual self-selection
equilibrium in the credit market prevails in this benchmark model. Next, we examine our
main model under the assumption that lenders cannot commit to a pre-announced auditing
policy. In this case, the auditing strategy by lenders is simultaneously determined with
the cheating strategy by borrowers as the equilibrium of Nash game. By contrasting the
benchmark model with the main model, we can then show how the lenders’ ability to commit,
or the lack of it, will affect the nature of the credit market equilibrium and subsequently the
macroeconomy.
Our analysis yields the following main findings. First, while the equilibrium contracts in
both cases with and without commitment to auditing offer the same loan rate to borrowers
who report low returns, the case without commitment to auditing has a higher equilibrium
4Bose and Cothren (1996) relies on a brand name that each lender purchases from a lender of the previous
generation as a commitment device to solve the time inconsistency problem – only if a lender honors the
brand name by implementing the terms of the separating contracts, he can sell his own brand name in the
future. However, it is difficult to see how such a mechanism can be matched with some real world practices.
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loan rate for borrowers who report high returns. This is because, when lenders cannot
commit, the equilibrium contract entails some cheating activities (under reporting) by bor-
rowers with high investment returns, which in turn will lower lender’s expected payoff in the
high-return state. As a result, lenders have to charge a higher loan rate for borrowers who
truthfully report high returns in order to compensate for the loss of revenue arising from the
cheating borrowers in this state. Second, analogous to Khalil (1997), the inability to commit
will lead to a higher auditing probability in equilibrium comparing to the benchmark model.
This result comes about because, since the higher loan rate for borrowers with high returns
under the no-commitment regime will also increase the incentives for these borrowers to
cheat, the auditing probability then must increase in order to keep the borrowers indifferent
between cheating and complying. Since auditing is wasteful as it expends resources, the more
frequent auditing arising from the inability to commit will result in less capital accumulation
and lower economic growth. In addition, due to the higher loan rate that borrowers with
high investment returns need to pay in our main model, the inability to commit is associated
with a lower level of social welfare as well. Finally, we study the effect of capital income
taxation on the credit market equilibrium and how it is affected by the ability to commit
by lenders. In this regard, we find that an increase in the tax rate on capital will generate
greater credit market distortions under the no-commitment regime. The existing studies,
by assuming commitment to auditing strategies by lenders, thus tend to under estimate the
credit market distortions caused by capital income taxation.
The present paper also lends itself well in the expanding line of inquiry that examines
the role of institutional factors in economic growth and development. The received wisdom
emerged from this literature argues that institutional factors offer a potential explanation
for the divergent growth experiences across different countries, with in particular weak insti-
tutions leading to slower economic growth. For example, La Porta et al. (1998) and Levine
(1999) find that strong institutions in legal enforcement of private property rights, support of
private contractual arrangements, and protection of the legal right of investors, foster finan-
cial development, which in turn promote capital accumulation and economic growth. Beck
and Levine (2004) provide a more detailed survey on this law-finance-growth nexus, which by
and large suggests a strong link among legal institutions, financial development, and growth.
In a recent paper using data on a cross-section of 17 countries covering the period from 1880
to 1997, Bordo and Rousseau (2006) find that deep institutional fundamentals, such as legal
origin and some political factors, can explain a good part of the cross-sectional variation in
financial development and growth. Acemoglu et al. (2005) study the interaction between
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political power/institution and economic institution (in the sense of private property right
protection) and argue that economic institutions encourage economic growth when political
institutions allocate power to groups with interests in broad-based property rights enforce-
ment. In all of these studies, the institutional strength is customarily measured in terms
of protecting creditors’ rights and reining in borrowers’ fraudulent behavior. In this regard,
we examine instead the importance in constraining lender’s behavior and making their pre-
announced auditing policies binding and credible. Although in practice, even in economies
that are commonly associated with having strong legal/political institutions, the (ex-post)
decisions to audit borrowers or not are largely left free to the lenders, our analysis suggests
that it may be desirable to introduce some commitment mechanisms to bind such free choices
of the lenders.5 Viewed in this light, the present paper offers a new micro-economic channel
through which institutional failings (i.e., the lack of commitment mechanisms) can lead to
greater credit market distortions, lower economic growth, and lower social welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic environment.
We devote section 3 to the benchmark model where commitment to auditing by lenders is
assumed. The main model under no commitment is analyzed in section 4. Section 5 compares
the economic growth rates and the social welfare of those two models in previous sections.
Section 6 studies the credit market distortions caused by capital income taxation, with and
without auditing commitment. We finally conclude and discuss some possible extensions in
section 7.
2 The Environment
The basic framework of our model is similar to Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bhat-
tacharya (1998). In the economy, there is an infinite sequence of two-period lived overlap-
ping generations. All generations are identical in size and composition, with each generation
consisting of an equal size of lenders (or workers) and borrowers (or entrepreneurs). The
population of young lenders/borrowers is normalized to a continuum with a measure of one
(thus the population of each generation has a measure of two). Lenders are at first workers
5One possible commitment mechanism of this sort is perhaps to delegate auditing to a third-party, inde-
pendent auditor. The auditor automatically carries out the necessary auditing, on the behalf of the lender
(for a fee of course), according to the probability specified in the offered contract initially. This way, the
pre-announced auditing strategies by the lenders are likely be binding, since the independent auditors have
incentives (the fees to be collected) to follow through with the pre-announced auditing even if the lenders
themselves do not. Of course, this mechanism of delegated auditing is only as effective as the system
that monitors the independent auditors themselves, as the recent corporate scandals involving some of the
accounting powerhouses like Auther Anderson had shown.
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who are endowed with one unit of labor when young, which is supplied inelastically on the
labor market at the competitive wage rate. They then play the role of lenders as their wages
provide the only source of loanable funds in the economy. On the other hand, each borrower
is an entrepreneur who is endowed with a project that produces capital goods and needs be
financed externally. The output of a borrower’s project can take one of two possible values
of κ1 and κ2, where 0 ≤ κ1 < κ2. The event κ1 (bad state) occurs with the probability pi1
and κ2 (good state) with pi2, where pi1 + pi2 = 1. Therefore, for i ∈ {1, 2}, an investment
project can with probability pii convert one unit of time t consumption good into κi units
of time t+ 1 capital good.All capital goods are supplied competitively at the market rental
rate. For simplicity, it is also assumed that both borrowers and lenders are risk neutral and
consume only when they are old.
The credit market operates as in Bencivenga and Smith (1993). In each period, after
earning the market wage, a young lender can lend his wage income to a borrower in exchange
for consumption goods in the next period. A lender makes an offer of a loan contract and, if
the contract is not dominated by others, a borrower will approach him to sign the contract.
Each lender will be approached by one borrower only and the competition in the credit
market will drive the lender’s economic profit to the reservation level, which is normalized
to zero. Alternatively, a lender has access to a default, risk-free technology that converts
one unit of his time t wage into q units of time t+ 1 consumption good.
To introduce asymmetric information in the credit market, we assume that a lender can
observe the output level, κ1 or κ2, of an individual borrower only after costly auditing.
Specifically, δ amount of capital goods, per unit of the loan, will be lost in the auditing
process. The project returns of a borrower will be appropriated by the lender if the borrower
is caught of lying under auditing.
Each borrower becomes a firm owner in his old age to produce the consumption good by
hiring capital and labor at the market rates. Each firm at time t produces the consumption
good according to the Cobb-Douglas production function:
yt = Ak¯
α
t k
γ
t l
1−γ
t (1)
where yt is the output per firm, A is a technology parameter, k¯t is the average capital stock
per firm, kt is the capital input of the firm and lt is the labor input of the firm. To sustain
perpetual long-run growth, it is assumed that α = 1−γ with 0 < γ < 1 as in the endogenous
growth literature. Since all firms hire the same amount of labor and there is an equal number
of borrowers and lenders, the number of labor force per firm, lt, must be equal to one in each
time period. The symmetry of firms also implies that k¯t = kt for all t. Hence, the rental
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rate, ρt, and the wage rate, wt, in period t are equal to the marginal products of capital and
labor, respectively:
ρt = γA, (2)
wt = A(1− γ)kt. (3)
Without loss of generality, physical capital is assumed to depreciate fully after one period of
use.
Finally, we maintain the following technical conditions throughout the paper:
γAκ1 < q < γA(pi1κ1 + pi2κ2 − δ). (4)
The first inequality says that the return from the risky investment in the bad state is less than
that from the risk-free, default technology. The second inequality is adopted to guarantee
the expected (net) return of the risky investment to be superior to the return of the risk-free
technology.
3 The Benchmark Model: Auditing with Commitment
As the basis for comparison, we first study a model in which the commitment to pre-
announced auditing by lenders is taken to be binding. As argued above, such a presumption
is necessary in order to avoid the time-consistency problem in many previous studies with
principal-agent setups. In this case, the loan contract at time t offered by a lender to a
borrower can be specified as Ct = [φ
1
t , φ
2
t , R
1
t , R
2
t , xt], where φ
1
t and φ
2
t are the auditing prob-
abilities when low and high output levels are reported respectively; R1t and R
2
t are the gross
loan rates (in real terms) when low and high output levels are reported respectively; and xt
is the loan size.6
Following the tradition in the literature, we will consider the equilibrium contracts that
give rise to the self-selection of borrowers. The expected payoff to a borrower of generation
t in such an equilibrium is then given by
pi1(κ1ρt+1 −R1t )xt + pi2(κ2ρt+1 −R2t )xt. (5)
Furthermore, in order to induce borrowers to truthfully report their output levels, the fol-
lowing incentive compatibility constraints must be satisfied:
(κ1ρt+1 −R1t )xt ≥ (1− φ2t )(κ1ρt+1 −R2t )xt, (6)
6As in Khalil (1997) and Wang and Williamson (1998), we do not further differentiate between the loan
rate in the state with auditing and that in the state without auditing to simplify the analysis.
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(κ2ρt+1 −R2t )xt ≥ (1− φ1t )(κ2ρt+1 −R1t )xt. (7)
Because the credit market is assumed to be perfectly competitive, lenders always earn
zero expected economic profit in equilibrium. This zero profit condition can be expressed as
pi1[φ
1
t (R
1
t − δρt+1) + (1− φ1t )R1t ]xt + pi2[φ2t (R2t − δρt+1) + (1− φ2t )R2t ]xt = qxt. (8)
The left hand side of this equation describes the expected income from making loans and
the right hand side the forgone income of the loan. In addition, the equilibrium loan size
must also satisfy the following feasibility constraint:
xt ≤ wt. (9)
Now, we can define the equilibrium in the credit market as follows.
Definition 1. An equilibrium in the credit market with commitment to audit is represented
by a sequence of contracts {Ct} , where Ct = [φ1t , φ2t , R1t , R2t , xt], that maximizes (5) subject
to (6) - (9) taking the price sequences of {ρt} and {wt} as given.
We proceed with deriving the equilibrium contracts here by assuming a standard property
in this type of models with adverse selection: in equilibrium, only the incentive compatibility
constraint for reporting high output, i.e. (7), is binding but not that for reporting low output,
i.e. (6).7 As a result, the binding incentive compatibility constraint of (7) yields that
φ1t =
R2t −R1t
κ2ρt+1 −R1t
. (10)
Making use of the zero-profit condition (8), one can show that the expected payoff to a
borrower is strictly decreasing in the auditing probabilities of φ1t and φ
2
t . Thus, since the
incentive compatibility constraint of (6) is not binding, implying that a borrow with the low
output will not have incentive to report the high output, it will not be optimal in equilibrium
for lenders to audit any borrowers who report the high level of output, i.e. φ2t = 0. Moreover,
it follows from (10) that φ1t is strictly decreasing with R
1
t . Hence, lenders will set R
1
t as high
as possible, i.e. R1t = γAκ1, in order to maximize the borrower’s expected payoff. The
7Indeed it can be easily verified that (6) holds with strict inequality and (7) holds with equality once
the the complete equilibrium contracts are derived. Intuitively, this property arises primarily because, in
equilibrium, the loan rate for reporting the low output level is lower than that for reporting the high output
level (i.e. R1t < R
2
t ). Hence, borrowers with high project returns have incentives to masquerade as those
with low project returns, but not vice versa.
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equilibrium loan rate for borrowers reporting the high output level can then be solved from
(8):
R2t =
q
pi2
− γApi1
pi2
(κ1 − δφ1t ). (11)
Substituting (11) into (10) in association with R1t = γAκ1, the auditing probability for
borrowers reporting the low output level is given by
φ1t ≡ φ =
q − γAκ1
γA[pi2(κ2 − κ1)− δpi1] , (12)
where 0 < φ < 1 follows from the technical assumptions in (4).
Combining (11) and (12), we can derive the equilibrium loan rate for borrowers reporting
the high output level as
R2t =
(κ2 − κ1)(q − γApi1κ1)− δγApi1κ1
pi2(κ2 − κ1)− δpi1 . (13)
It is worth to note that, from (13), R2t > R
1
t (= γAκ1) holds under (4).
Finally, it can be easily verified that in equilibrium κiρt+1 − Rit are non-negative for
i = 1, 2. It then follows immediately that (9) must hold with equality in equilibrium, which
determine the loan size for borrowers.
We now summarize the above results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In each period t, the equilibrium loan contract is given by Ct = [φ
1
t , φ
2
t , R
1
t , R
2
t , xt]
with φ1t =
q−γAκ1
γA[pi2(κ2−κ1)−pi1δ] , φ
2
t = 0, R
1
t = γAκ1, R
2
t =
(κ2−κ1)(q−γApi1κ1)−δγApi1κ1
pi2(κ2−κ1)−pi1δ , xt = wt.
Note that next period’s capital is produced by the investment projects of current bor-
rowers. Since those borrowers that report high output level are never audited while those
with low output level are (with probability φ), recalling the investment technology of the
borrowers and full depreciation of capital, the economy-wide capital stock at t + 1 is given
by:
Kt+1 = (pi1κ1 + pi2κ2 − δpi1φ)wt.
Since the total number of firms is equal to one and wt = A(1− γ)kt, the growth rate of
capital stock per firm, and hence of aggregate production, over period t is given by
gt ≡ kt+1
kt
= A(1− γ)(pi1κ1 + pi2κ2 − δpi1φ). (14)
The social welfare of this economy is simply the sum of borrowers’ and lenders’ expected
payoffs
Wt = pi1(γAκ1 −R1t )wt + pi2(γAκ2 −R2t )wt + qwt. (15)
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Auditing with commitment enables lenders to use pre-announced auditing probabilities
to achieve self selection from borrowers. However, this assumption is indeed problematic as
it is not a sub-game perfect behavior for lenders: Once the borrowers are induced to reveal
their output levels truthfully, it is no longer optimal for lenders to audit anymore. In what
follows, we are going to characterize the optimal contracts under which this assumption no
longer holds and study its impacts on economic growth and social welfare.
4 The Main Model: Auditing without Commitment
In this section, we consider the more realistic scenario in which the commitment by lenders
to any pre-announced auditing strategies is taken as not possible for reasons we articulated
previously. This inability to commit implies that it would not be meaningful to include
any auditing probabilities in lenders’ contract offers, as they would simply be disregarded as
non-credible and hence non-binding. Under this no-commitment regime, the loan contract
offered by a lender to a borrower at time t is characterized as Ct = [R
1
t , R
2
t , xt], where R
1
t ,
R2t , and xt are similarly defined as in the previous section. Following Khalil (1997) and
Khalil and Parigi (1998), the auditing probabilities of lenders are determined together with
the cheating probabilities of borrowers in a simultaneous Nash game after the contract Ct is
offered. Thus, the credit market equilibrium in the current model will be captured by a two-
stage problem which can be solved backwards. In the second stage, the lenders’ auditing
strategies and borrowers’ cheating strategies are simultaneously determined for the given
contract terms. The equilibrium contract terms are then determined in the first stage by
maximizing the borrowers’ expected payoff subject to a proper set of constraints.
We consider the second-stage problem first. For i = 1, 2, let φit be the lender’s auditing
probability when the borrower reports the state-i output and νit be the probability that a
borrower with the state-i output but reports the state-j output instead, where i 6= j. For
a given contract offer of Ct, the Nash equilibrium auditing and cheating strategies of φ
i
t
and νit (i = 1, 2) can be derived as follows. As will be shown later that R
1
t < R
2
t holds in
the equilibrium contract,8 it is then obvious that truth-telling is the dominant strategy for
borrowers who experience the adverse shock and end up with the low output level (i = 1),
hence ν1t = 0. Since borrowers with low output level never cheat (ν
1
t = 0), as a part of
the Nash equilibrium response, lenders would never need to audit borrowers who report the
high output level, hence φ2t = 0. Thus, only those borrowers with the high output level have
8We will explicitly verify in the appendix that indeed this is the case.
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incentives to cheat, whereas lenders only need to audit those who report the low output
level. Specifically, these mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of cheating (ν2t ) and auditing
(φ1t ) for the second-stage problem between borrowers and lenders are determined from the
following conditions:9
(1− φ1t )(κ2ρt+1 −R1t )xt = (κ2ρt+1 −R2t )xt, (16)
pi2ν
2
t
pi1 + pi2ν2t
(κ2ρt+1 − δρt+1)xt + pi1
pi1 + pi2ν2t
(R1t − δρt+1)xt = R1txt. (17)
The left hand side of equation (16) is the expected payoff of a borrower with the high
project return but chooses to underreport (cheats), while the right hand side is the expected
payoff if the same borrower reports truthfully. This equation says that, given lenders’ au-
diting strategy, borrowers with high project returns are indifferent between cheating and
complying in equilibrium. Analogously, the left hand side of equation (17) represents a
lender’s expected payoff when he audits (someone who reports the low output level), while
the right hand side measures his payoff when he simply takes the borrower’s words and does
not audit. Thus, given borrowers’ cheating strategy, lenders are indifferent in equilibrium
between auditing and not auditing borrowers who report low project returns.
Solving φ1t and ν
2
t from (16) and (17), in terms of the contractual terms in Ct, we obtain
that
φ1t =
R2t −R1t
κ2ρt+1 −R1t
, (18)
ν2t =
δpi1ρt+1
pi2(κ2ρt+1 − δρt+1 −R1t )
. (19)
Together with φ2t = ν
1
t = 0, (18) and (19) complete the characterization of the equilibrium
for the second-stage Nash game.
The above characterization of φit and ν
i
t (i = 1, 2) from the second-stage problem can then
be used to determine the first-stage equilibrium contract Ct = [R
1
t , R
2
t , xt]. Since φ
2
t = ν
1
t = 0,
the expected payoff to a borrower of generation t can be written as follows:
pi1(κ1ρt+1 −R1t )xt + pi2
[
ν2t (1− φ1t )(κ2ρt+1 −R1t ) + (1− ν2t )(κ2ρt+1 −R2t )
]
xt. (20)
9It is easy to see that there is no pure-strategy equilibrium of φ1tand v
2
t . For instance, if lenders never
audit those who report low output (φ1t = 0), borrowers with high output level would always cheat (v
2
t = 1),
but then φ1t = 0 would not be optimal. Similarly, if lenders always audit those who report low output
(φ1t = 1), borrowers with high output level would never cheat (v2t = 0), but then φ1t = 1 would not be
optimal.
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Assuming perfect competition in loan making in the credit market, as is customary in the
literature, in equilibrium lenders will offer the most favorable contractual terms to borrowers
to the extent possible.
In equilibrium, due to competitive loan making and since φ2t = ν
1
t = 0, the zero (eco-
nomic) profit condition for lenders again holds and can be written as
(pi1 + pi2ν
2
t )
{
φ1t
[
pi2ν
2
t
pi1 + pi2ν2t
(κ2ρt+1 − δρt+1) + pi1
pi1 + pi2ν2t
(R1t − δρt+1)
]
+ (1− φ1t )R1t
}
xt
+pi2(1− ν2t )R2txt = qxt. (21)
The first term on the left hand side of (21) represents the expected payoff that a lender can
collect from a borrower who reports the low output level, which occurs with probability pi1+
pi2ν
2
t . If the lender audits such a borrower, he will find that with probability pi2ν
2
t /(pi1+pi2ν
2
t )
this borrower is indeed under reporting his project return (i.e. the borrower had actually
encountered a favorable output shock), in which case the borrower’s entire investment output
will be appropriated and the lender’s net profit is equal to κ2ρt+1− δρt+1 times the loan size;
and with probability pi1/(pi1 + pi2ν
2
t ), however, the borrower is reporting truthfully, in which
case the lender’s net profit is equal to R1t − δρt+1 times the loan size. On the other hand, if
the lender does not audit the low-output-reporting borrower, he will simply collect R1t per
unit of loan irrespective of whether the borrower is cheating. The second term on the left
hand side of (21) is lender’s expected payoff collected from a borrower who reports the high
output level, which occurs with probability pi2(1− ν2t ) (recall that there will be no auditing
in this case). The right hand side of this equation is simply the opportunity cost of the loan.
In addition, the equilibrium contracts must also satisfy the following feasibility condition:
xt ≤ wt. (22)
Now, we can define the equilibrium in the credit market formally as follows.
Definition 2. An equilibrium in the credit market without commitment to audit is repre-
sented by a sequence of contracts {Ct}, where Ct = [R1t , R2t , xt], and a sequence of auditing
and cheating strategies {φit, νit} (i = 1, 2), where φ2t = ν1t = 0, that maximize (20) subject to
(18), (19) , (21), and (22) taking the price sequences of {ρt}, {wt} as given.
To derive the complete credit market equilibrium, we first note that with substitution
from (16) the borrowers’ expected payoff function (20) can be rewritten as
pi1(κ1ρt+1 −R1t )xt + pi2(κ2ρt+1 −R2t )xt. (23)
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Similarly, by substituting (17) into the lenders’ zero profit condition (21), we obtain that
(pi1 + pi2ν
2
t )R
1
txt + pi2(1− ν2t )R2txt = qxt. (24)
By combining (19), (23), and (24), we show in the appendix that a borrower’s expected
payoff is strictly increasing with R1t . Hence, it will again be optimal to set R
1
t to be as high
as possible, i.e., R1t ≡ R1 = κ1ρt+1 = γAκ1. Substituting this result into (19) yields the
following equilibrium cheating probability:
ν2t ≡ ν =
δpi1
pi2(κ2 − κ1 − δ) . (25)
We then can solve from (24) after making use of (25) and R1t = γAκ1 that
R2t =
(κ2 − κ1)(q − γApi1κ1)− δq
pi2(κ2 − κ1)− δ . (26)
Substituting (26) and R1t = γAκ1 into (18) gives us the following equilibrium auditing
probability:
φ1t ≡ φ =
(q − γAκ1)(κ2 − κ1 − δ)
γA(κ2 − κ1)[pi2(κ2 − κ1)− δ] . (27)
Again, since it is easy to verify that κiρt+1 − Rit (i = 1, 2) are non-negative, the resource
constraint (22) must hold with equality. Furthermore, 0 < v < 1 and 0 < φ < 1 are both
guaranteed by the technical assumptions in (4).
Now we summarize the above results in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. In each period t, the credit market equilibrium is characterized in two parts.
First, the equilibrium loan contract is given by Ct = [R
1
t , R
2
t , xt] with R
1
t = γAκ1, R
2
t from
(26) and xt = wt. Second, the cheating and auditing probabilities are given by ν
1
t = φ
2
t = 0,
0 < ν2t < 1 from (25), and 0 < φ
1
t < 1 from (27).
In the credit market equilibrium outlined in Proposition 2, cheating on the part of bor-
rowers (those who have high investment returns) does take place, as does auditing by lenders.
This leads to a non-separating equilibrium where borrowers are no longer sorted by their true
investment outcomes. In particular, among the borrowers reporting the low output level,
some are those whose projects had truly received the unfavorable shock but some are those
who underreport. Auditing offers the only means of distinguishing the types of borrowers
in this case. In what follows, we will primarily focus on the macroeconomic consequences of
such a credit market equilibrium.
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Recalling that the cost of auditing essentially represents the deadweight loss in capital
accumulation, and with full capital depreciation, the economy-wide aggregate capital stock
in period t+ 1 in this model is equal to
Kt+1 = [pi1κ1 + pi2κ2 − δ(pi1 + pi2ν)φ]xt.
Since the number of firms is normalized to 1 and wt = A(1 − γ)kt, the growth rate of
capital stock and hence of aggregate output for period t is equal to
gt =
kt+1
kt
= A(1− γ)[pi1κ1 + pi2κ2 − δ(pi1 + pi2ν)φ]. (28)
From the law of large numbers, there is no aggregate uncertainty in the total payoffs to
the population of borrowers, as well as in that of lenders. Since their sizes are normalized to
one, the total payoffs to borrowers and lenders are given in (23) and (24), respectively. By
aggregating the payoffs across borrowers and lenders, the time-t economy-wide social welfare
is then represented by
Wt = pi1(γAκ1 −R1t )wt + pi2(γAκ2 −R2t )wt + qwt. (29)
5 The Consequences of the Inability to Commit
We discuss in this section the economic implications, particularly on growth and welfare, of
the inability to commit by lenders to auditing contracts in the credit market. Technically,
this can be easily accomplished by comparing the two models analyzed in the previous two
sections since they differ only in the assumption regarding the lenders’ ability in making
auditing commitment. Throughout this and the remaining sections of this paper, all en-
dogenous variables in the main model without auditing commitment will be capped with the
symbol “tilde” to facilitate the comparison between these two models. Such a comparison
yields the following results with regard to the terms of equilibrium contract, the economic
growth rate, and the level of social welfare.
Proposition 3. Comparing the benchmark model and the main model with and without au-
diting commitment, respectively, the following inequalities hold: R˜2t > R
2
t , φ˜
1
t > φ
1
t , g˜t < gt,
and W˜t < Wt.
Proof: Recalling (4), it follows directly from (13) and (26) that
R˜2t −R2t =
(κ2 − κ1)(q − γApi1κ1)− δq
pi2(κ2 − κ1)− δ −
(κ2 − κ1)(q − γApi1κ1)− δγApi1κ1
pi2(κ2 − κ1)− pi1δ
=
δ2pi1(q − γAκ1)
[pi2(κ2 − κ1)− δ][pi2(κ2 − κ1)− pi1δ] > 0.
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Similarly, from (12) and (27), we obtain that
φ˜1t − φ1t =
(q − γAκ1)(κ2 − κ1 − δ)
γA(κ2 − κ1)[pi2(κ2 − κ1)− δ] −
q − γAκ1
γA[pi2(κ2 − κ1)− pi1δ]
=
(q − γAκ1)pi1δ2
γA(κ2 − κ1)[pi2(κ2 − κ1)− δ][pi2(κ2 − κ1)− pi1δ] > 0.
Since φ˜ > φ and 0 < ν (< 1), g˜t < gt follows immediately by comparing (14) and (28).
Finally, since w˜t = wt, R˜
1
t = R
1
t and R˜
2
t > R
2
t , W˜t < Wt follows from inspection of (15) and
(29). Hence, the proposition is proved. QED
Some observations are in order. First, R˜2t > R
2
t implies that the inability to commit by
lenders leads to a higher equilibrium loan rate for borrowers who report the high output
level. The intuition for this result can be understood as follows. In order to minimize the
incentives of cheating by high-return borrowers, the loan rate for reporting the low output is
set to be as high as possible, and hence the same (R˜1t = R
1
t ), in both cases with and without
auditing commitment by lenders. However, under no-commitment, the equilibrium exhibits
a positive probability of cheating behavior by borrowers with high returns: in equilibrium,
a fraction of the high-return borrowers will underreport in order to avoid paying a higher
interest rate (R˜1t < R˜
2
t ). As can be seen from (24), lenders expect to recover their loans
only according to the lower loan rate of R˜1t from this fraction of borrowers.
10 To compensate
for the loss of revenue recovered from the fraction of cheaters, lenders must raise the loan
rate that applies to borrowers who truthfully report the high output level, R2t , in order to
maintain their zero profit condition (24).
Next, the inability to commit also leads to more frequent auditing by lenders in the
equilibrium (φ˜1t > φ
1
t ). This result is analogous to that of Proposition 3 in Khalil (1997).
Intuitively, a higher loan rate of R˜2t under no-commitment, than its counterpart in the case
with auditing commitment, increases the potential benefit from cheating. To counter balance
such a tightened incentive to cheat, a greater probability of auditing is needed to maintain
the equilibrium condition (16).
The macro implications of the inability to commit are straightforward. The result here
on growth says that the growth rate in the model without auditing commitment will be
10In fact, not all borrowers who cheat end up paying the same amount to lenders: those who were caught
(by auditing) will have their entire investment output appropriated and those who got away (not being
audited) will pay only the lower loan rate of R1t . However, from (17), in equilibrium a lender’s expected
payoff from auditing a borrower reporting the low output has to be the same as the payoff from not auditing,
which is equal to R1t per unit of loan. Thus lenders are expected to recover from any borrowers, including
the cheaters, who report the low output at the loan rate of R1t regardless if auditing takes place.
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lower than that in the benchmark model. This result comes about because that the lack
of auditing commitment brings cheating and hence more frequent auditing in the credit
market and that auditing activities are costly in the sense of causing deadweight loss in real
resources. Consequently, under no-commitment, the process of capital accumulation is less
efficient and economic growth is slower.
Finally, as in (15) and (29), the social welfare in any period consists of the aggregate
payoffs/consumption over three groups of individuals: the borrowers with low project returns,
the borrowers with high project returns, and the lenders. Recalling R1t = γAκ1 in both cases
with and without auditing commitment, the net payoff of a borrower with low output will
be squeezed to zero in both models. Furthermore, a lender’s payoff in both models will be
simply equal to the (opportunity) cost of funds due to competition in lending.11 Thus, for
any given level of capital, which model gives rise to a higher welfare level hinges upon the
equilibrium payoffs of the borrowers with high project returns. Although some of these high-
return borrowers will cheat under no-commitment, from (16), their expected payoffs from
cheating in equilibrium will in fact be just the same as that from complying. Therefore,
the aggregate payoff to the high-return borrowers as a group is always determined as if they
all comply. When auditing commitment is absent, since compliance means paying a higher
interest rate (R˜2t > R
2
t ), the lower total payoffs to the group of high-return borrowers, and
hence the economy-wide welfare, will be lower.
To conclude, with equal initial conditions, the economy in which lenders are unable to pre-
commit any auditing strategies would grow slower and enjoy lower social welfare than that
in which such commitment is operative. Interpreting the ability for lenders to make auditing
commitment as reflecting the strength of financial and legal institutions in an economy, the
above results are consistent with the line of research that suggests weak institutions as a
cause for the divergence in growth and living standards among different countries.
6 The Effects of Capital Income Taxation
In this section, we extend the above analysis to study the effects of a capital income tax policy.
The main purpose is to show how the effects of such a government taxation policy is affected
by the consideration of auditing commitment in the credit market. To this end, we introduce
into the previous basic environment a constant flat tax, at the rate of τ , levied on capital
11Specifically, each lender’s expected payoff is equal to q times loan size.
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income, presumably to finance some exogenously given government expenditures.12 We again
divide our discussion into two cases with different auditing commitment assumptions.
6.1 The commitment case
We first examine the credit market equilibrium when lenders’ commitment to auditing is
taken as given. In this case, after the imposition of the capital income tax, the equilibrium
loan contract in period t is then given by the solution to the following problem:
max pi1[(1− τ)κ1ρt+1 −R1t ]xt + pi2[(1− τ)κ2ρt+1 −R2t ]xt (30)
subject to
[(1− τ)κ1ρt+1 −R1t ]xt ≥ (1− φ2t )[(1− τ)κ1ρt+1 −R2t ]xt, (31)
[(1− τ)κ2ρt+1 −R2t ]xt ≥ (1− φ1t )[(1− τ)κ2ρt+1 −R1t ]xt, (32)
pi1[φ
1
t (R
1
t − δρt+1) + (1− φ1t )R1t ]xt + pi2[φ2t (R2t − δρt+1) + (1− φ2t )R2t ]xt = qxt, (33)
xt ≤ wt. (34)
Eqs. (31) - (34) are simply the incentive compatibility constraints, the lender’s zero profit
condition, and the feasibility constraint on loan size, respectively. Following the similar
procedures in section 3, one can easily derive the equilibrium loan contracts in this credit
market, which are stated in a proposition in below.
Proposition 4. In each period t, the equilibrium loan contract is given by Ct = [φ
1
t , φ
2
t , R
1
t , R
2
t , xt]
with φ1t =
q−(1−τ)γAκ1
γA[pi2(1−τ)(κ2−κ1)−δpi1] , φ
2
t = 0, R
1
t = (1−τ)γAκ1, R2t = (1−τ){(κ2−κ1)[q−(1−τ)γApi1κ1]−δγApi1κ1}pi2(1−τ)(κ2−κ1)−δpi1 ,
and xt = wt.
One immediate result of interest is that, as can be readily verified from the expression
of φ1t , that the equilibrium auditing probability is positively related to the tax rate, τ , on
capital income. To see the intuition of this result, note that in equilibrium the incentive
constraint (32) will be binding. More precisely, after xt is removed from both sides, this
constraint becomes
[(1− τ)κ2ρt+1 −R2t ] = (1− φ1t )[(1− τ)κ2ρt+1 −R1t ],
12To ensure that, after taxation, the equilibrium auditing and cheating strategies are strictly between
zero and one and borrowers’ expected payoff is increasing with the loan size, we need to replace (4) by:
(1− τ)γAκ1 < q < γA(1− τ)(pi1κ1 + pi2κ2)− γδ, which implicitly requires that τ < pi2A(κ2−κ1)−δpi2A(κ2−κ1) .
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where the left hand side of the equation is the net payoff (per unit of loan) to a high-return
borrower from reporting truthfully and the right hand side is that from underreporting his
output. After substituting in the equilibrium loan rates and some algebraic manipulation,
one will see that, increasing the capital income tax rate, τ , will hurt the net payoff to a honest
borrower (the left hand side) more than it will do a dishonest one. Therefore, a high-return
borrower will have a stronger incentive to masquerade as one with low return when the tax
rate rises. In order to keep this constraint in balance, as a result, the auditing probability
must increase. To the extent that auditing leads to deadweight loss in resources, this result
says that a higher tax rate on capital gives rise to greater distortions in the credit market.
6.2 The no-commitment case
Under no-commitment, the credit market equilibrium will be determined from the two-
stage problem described in Section 4. Similarly, we can obtain that ν1t = φ
2
t = 0 holds in
equilibrium. The rest of the credit market equilibrium can then be solved from the following:
max pi1[(1− τ)κ1ρt+1 −R1t ]xt + pi2{ν2t (1− φ1t )[(1− τ)κ2ρt+1 −R1t ]
+(1− ν2t )[(1− τ)κ2ρt+1 −R2t )]}xt (35)
subject to
(pi1 + pi2ν
2
t ){φ1t
[
pi2ν
2
t
pi1 + pi2ν2t
[(1− τ)κ2ρt+1 − δρt+1] + pi1
pi1 + pi2ν2t
(R1t − δρt+1)
]
+(1− φ1t )R1t}xt + pi2(1− ν2t )R2txt = qxt, (36)
(1− φ1t )[(1− τ)κ2ρt+1 −R1t ] = (1− τ)κ2ρt+1 −R2t , (37)
pi2ν
2
t
pi1 + pi2ν2t
[(1− τ)κ2ρt+1 − δρt+1] + pi1
pi1 + pi2ν2t
(R1t − δρt+1) = R1t , (38)
xt ≤ wt. (39)
In the above problem, the borrowers’ expected payoff function is maximized subject
to four constraints: (36) is the lenders’ zero profit condition, (37) and (38) are the Nash
equilibrium conditions for determining the second-stage cheating and auditing strategies (φ1t
and ν2t ), and (39) is the feasibility constraint on loan size. The complete credit market
equilibrium can be similarly derived and characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 5. In each period t, the equilibrium loan contract is given by Ct = [R
1
t , R
2
t , xt]
with R1t = (1−τ)γAκ1, R2t = {(1−τ)(κ2−κ1)[q−(1−τ)γApi1κ1]−δq}pi2(1−τ)(κ2−κ1)−δ and xt = wt; while the equilibrium
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cheating and auditing strategies are given by {φit, νit} (i = 1, 2) with ν1t = φ2t = 0, φ1t and ν2t
(both strictly between 0 and 1) determined as follows
φ1t = φ =
[q − (1− τ)γAκ1][(1− τ)(κ2 − κ1)− δ]
γA(1− τ)(κ2 − κ1)[pi2(1− τ)(κ2 − κ1)− δ] , (40)
ν2t = v =
δpi1
pi2[(1− τ)(κ2 − κ1)− δ] . (41)
Several implications can be drawn. First, it is easy to verify that both φ and ν are
increasing with the tax rate on capital, τ . While the positive relation between φ and τ is in
accordance with and can be explained in the same way as in the commitment case, the one
between ν and τ is novel. Intuitively, when τ is increased, a lender’s expected payoff from
auditing for any given ν decreases by more than does his expected payoff from no auditing,
which would lower his incentive to audit. In response, those high-return borrowers would
cheat more intensively by raising ν. More precisely, recall the following equation that pins
down the equilibrium cheating probability ν by comparing a lender’s net expected payoff
from auditing and that from no-auditing
pi2νt
pi1 + pi2νt
[(1− τ)κ2ρt+1 − δρt+1] + pi1
pi1 + pi2νt
(R1t − δρt+1) =
pi2νt
pi1 + pi2νt
R1t +
pi1
pi1 + pi2νt
R1t .
The left hand side of the above equation is a lender’s net expected return from auditing and
the right hand side is that from no auditing. After substituting in the relevant equilibrium
loan contract terms, it is easy to verify that increasing the tax rate τ reduces the left hand
side more than it does the right hand side for any given ν. Consequently, lender has a lower
incentive to audit, which in turn induces the high-return borrowers to cheat with a higher
frequency.
Second, it is straightforward to show that, for any tax rate τ , the equilibrium auditing
probability under no-commitment is higher than that with auditing commitment, i.e., φ˜1t >
φ1t . This implies that the tax-induced credit market distortions (in the form deadweight
loss due to auditing) are more pronounced when the mechanism for auditing commitment is
absent. Intuitively, the inability to commit leads to positive equilibrium cheating, which is
only countered by increased auditing activities, and thus results in greater market distortions.
Furthermore, it is easy to show
∂(φ˜1t−φ1t )
∂τ
> 0, which implies that the additional credit market
distortions resulted from the inability to commit rises with the level of tax rate on capital.
Lastly, since a simple comparison reveals that R˜2t > R
2
t and φ˜
1
t > φ
1
t continue to hold for
a given capital income tax rate, the growth and welfare implications obtained in Proposition
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3 also carry over to the current setting with capital income taxation. In other words, the
inability to commit by lenders again leads to slower economic growth and lower social welfare
in the economy with positive taxation on capital.
To end this section, from the policy perspective, it is worth to emphasize that the inability
to commit exacerbates the incentive distortions created by the capital income tax policy at
the first place, through raising the borrowers’ cheating probability and the lenders’ auditing
probability in the credit market equilibrium. Therefore, the studies that implicitly assume
auditing commitment by lenders run the risk of under estimating the macroeconomic effects
of government taxation policies.
7 Conclusion
It has been widely argued that weak institutions can prevent poor countries from catch-
ing up with the rich. Presumably, institutional strength for contract enforcement can be
measured in terms of not only its ability to rein in borrowers’ fraudulent behavior, as has
been much scrutinized in the existing literature, but also to discipline lenders’ contractual
commitment. In this regard, our analysis proposes a new micro-economic channel – the
inability to commit to auditing in a credit market with costly state verification – through
which the widely held view is confirmed. Alternatively, our analysis in the present paper can
be interpreted as suggesting how the failings in institutional arrangements to bind lenders’
auditing responsibilities could be detrimental to economic growth and social welfare.
To demonstrate how this channel works, we developed and compared two endogenous
growth models. In the first model, lenders, by committing to a costly auditing technology,
are able to identify the true output levels of borrowers by inducing the self-selection behavior
from them. As opposed to this common approach in this line of research, we assume that
lenders cannot commit to their auditing strategy a la Khalil (1997) in the second model. The
lack of commitment to auditing implies that the interaction between lenders and borrowers
becomes a two-stage problem. In the second stage of the problem, a mixed strategy equilib-
rium is found in which both lenders audit and borrowers cheat with positive probabilities.
In the first stage, lenders determine the optimal loan contract terms that are consistent
with the mixed strategy equilibrium in the second stage. We found that the loan rate and
auditing probability are higher, while economic growth rate and social welfare lower, in the
regime without commitment. It is also shown that, a capital income tax policy generates an
additional adverse incentive effect on growth and social welfare via the cheating probability
when commitment to auditing is absent.
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In typical studies of asymmetric information, the announced contractual enforcement
(e.g., auditing and monitoring) by lenders is implicitly assumed to be taken at its face value
and the separating contracts are then designed accordingly. Such an assumption can be quite
problematic for at least two types of reasons. First, the equilibrium suffers from the time-
inconsistency problem: lenders will be unwilling to carry out the required costly enforcement
activities once they know the carefully designed contracts would indeed work to induce self
selection. Second, weak contractual enforcement and weak legal institutions will not be able
to renege the time-inconsistency problem by using institutional mechanisms as a commitment
device to make lenders’ auditing strategy binding. As has been shown in our analysis, this
inability to commit by lenders, acting as an additional source of informational friction, has
non-trivial consequences. It is also worth pointing out that the lack of commitment to audit
by lenders will lead to non-separating equilibrium, where cheating behavior by the (some)
borrowers is a necessary condition of the equilibrium. It is precisely this cheating behavior by
borrowers eventually justifies more stringent contractual terms and results in greater credit
market distortions.
Since the idea of commitment to audit has been embedded in a model with relatively
simple structure in the present paper, potential ways of extensions are possible. One possi-
bility is to introduce transitional dynamics into a neoclassical version of the model, which
will allow us to study how both the auditing and cheating probabilities evolve and inter-
act at different stages of development. Another possible extension is to develop potential
remedies for fixing the inability to commit to audit. In Khalil and Parigi (1998), lenders
choose to give a higher loan size under no-commitment case as a commitment device, hoping
to convince the borrowers that they are at stake to audit since the expected returns from
auditing positively depends on the loan size. In the current setup, loan size plays no such
role since borrowers always prefer to obtain as much funds as they can. Therefore, it will be
interesting to examine, when the loan size is endogenized, whether the same results in the
current model will continue to hold.
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Appendix
Proofs of claims in deriving the credit market equilibrium under
no commitment
Claim 1: In equilibrium, the loan rate for reporting the low output level is lower than that
for reporting the high output level, i.e. R1t < R
2
t , under the parameter assumptions in (4).
Proof: From the equilibrium loan rates given in Proposition 2, we have
R2t −R1t =
(κ2 − κ1)(q − γApi1κ1)− δq
pi2(κ2 − κ1)− δ − γAκ1
=
(κ2 − κ1)(q − γApi1κ1)− δq − γAκ1 [pi2(κ2 − κ1)− δ]
pi2(κ2 − κ1)− δ
=
(κ2 − κ1 − δ)(q − γAκ1)
pi2(κ2 − κ1)− δ .
Since κ1 < pi1κ1 + pi2κ2 − δ from (4) and pi1 + pi2 = 1, it is obvious that κ2 − κ1 − δ >
pi2(κ2 − κ1) − δ > 0. Together with γAκ1 < q, again, from (4), we obtain from the above
equation that R2t −R1t > 0. Hence, the claim is proved. QED
Claim 2: In equilibrium, the expected payoff to a borrower is increasing with R1t under (4).
Therefore, it will be optimal to set R1t = κ1ρt+1 = γAκ1.
Proof: With the substitution of (16) into (20), a borrower’s expected payoff is given by
Ut ≡ (pi1κ1 + pi2κ2)ρt+1xt − (pi1R1t + pi2R2t )xt,
which can be rewritten after substituting R2t from the zero-profit condition (24) as
Ut = (pi1κ1 + pi2κ2)ρt+1xt − (pi1R1t +
q
1− νt −
pi1 + pi2νt
1− νt R
1
t )xt
= (pi1κ1 + pi2κ2)ρt+1xt − q
1− νtxt +
νt
1− νtR
1
txt
= (pi1κ1 + pi2κ2)ρt+1xt − qxt − νt
1− νt (q −R
1
t )xt.
where νt =
δpi1ρt+1
pi2(κ2ρt+1−δρt+1−R1t ) . Then, we have
∂Ut
∂R1t
= −∂(
νt
1−νt )
∂R1t
(q −R1t )xt +
νtxt
1− νt
=
δγApi1(γApi2κ2 − pi2q − γAδ)
(γApi2κ2 − pi2R1t − γAδ)2
xt.
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It follows from (4) that (γApi2κ2 − pi2q − γAδ) − pi1(q − γAκ1) > 0, which implies that
γApi2κ2−pi2q−γAδ > pi1(q−γAκ1) > 0. Therefore, ∂Ut∂R1t > 0, and hence the claim is proved.
QED
Claim 3: In equilibrium, κ2ρt+1 −R2t must be positive under (4).
Proof: In equilibrium, R2t =
(κ2−κ1)(q−γApi1κ1)−δq
pi2(κ2−κ1)−δ , it is easy to check that
γAκ2 − (κ2 − κ1)(q − γApi1κ1)− δq
pi2(κ2 − κ1)− δ
=
[(κ2 − κ1)(γApi1κ1 + γApi2κ2 − q)− δ(γAκ2 − q)]
pi2(κ2 − κ1)− δ > 0.
The last inequality follows from the assumptions in (4). QED
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